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Preface
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a leading Japanese expert on studies of the allied occupation of Japan,
offered a paper on ‘Democratization and the Evasion of War
Responsibility.
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The American-led Occupation of Japan was a remarkable historical
event. The first time in its history that the country had been successfully
invaded, Japan was ‘revolutionized from above’ by an unprecedented
program of demilitarization and democratization designed to transform
the country into a peace-loving nation run by a government ‘in
accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the Japanese people’.
ii
A rigidly hierarchical state officially dedicated to the execution of the
Imperial Will was given a constitution that placed sovereignty in the
hands of the people and forbade the presence of military forces on
Japanese soil.  In addition, most of the legal constraints upon the
holding and expression of opinions that had resulted in the
imprisonment, hard labour and deaths of tens of thousands of those
deemed insufficiently enthusiastic in their support of the ‘national polity’
were struck down. Once-imprisoned communists started to contribute to
a legalized political discourse that included the castigation of the
Emperor and his ministers for eating too much while the rest of the
population starved.
iii With even the crime of lese-majeste seemingly
about to become an anachronism, Japan was entering a new historical
era with the legitimacy of its traditional power structure appearing in the
midst of unprecedented attack.
The contradictions implied in the idea that a country can be liberalized
and democratized ‘from above’ has encouraged conservative academics4
and right-wing politicians in Japan to argue that the Occupation was a
foreign imposition and even a violation of international law.
iv But (as
occupation scholars such as Takemae Eiji and many others argue) the
successful efforts of Japanese people in rejecting the efforts of their
conservative leaders to amend the constitution and eliminate its ‘no-war’
provision is an extremely important indication of the enduring legacy of
the early Occupation reforms.
v This did not mean that all GHQ’s reforms
were lasting; nor did it mean that the United States continued to support
many of its earlier initiatives. Despite the existence of the Constitution
and Article Nine, Cold War priorities and intense pressure from
Washington both before and after the Occupation ended in 1952 has
ensured that Japan’s Self Defence Force – while not officially an army –
is nevertheless one of the most well-funded and potentially one of the
biggest military establishments in the world. But these important caveats
aside, it remains difficult to deny that the early Occupation reforms
provided a crucial impetus and breathing-space for the generation of a
genuine popular democracy ‘from below’; or that – however dictatorial,
patrician or even racial in attitude – GHQ/SCAP’s democratization
directives were a catalyst enabling the Japanese subsequently to ensure
that the country’s break with its authoritarian past would remain
permanent. In retrospect, there seems little doubt that what one historian
described as ‘Japan’s American interlude’
vi played an essential part in
the country’s transition to a vibrant postwar democracy.
The Occupation, however, entailed more than people benefiting from the
liberalization of Japan’s political system. The process of returning Japan
to a peacetime footing entailed enormous human costs; simply
repatriating millions of soldiers and their families resulted in widespread
distress, bereavement, orphans and homelessness. In addition, there5
was more than one occupation of Japan. In stark contrast to Japan’s
main islands, Okinawans and residents of Japanese-inhabited northern
islands off the tip of Hokkaido did not enjoy the fruits of the Japanese
postwar constitution or the relatively benign process of an indirect
Occupation, but were instead subjected to the harsh regimen of direct
US and Soviet military rule. Okinawa had already lost one out of three of
its entire civilian population in less than three months in the some of the
Second World War’s most savage fighting during the summer of 1945.
The island’s subsequent occupation did not end until 1972, twenty years
after the Occupation of Japan proper had been wound up, and then only
after more than 20 percent of the island’s land had been forcibly
appropriated to function indefinitely as bases for U.S. armed forces. The
northern territories and their Japanese inhabitants remain under Russian
military rule today.
vii
Other groups also failed to benefit from the Occupation. These include
the country’s 2-3 million burakumin, the dwindling Ainu people, and non-
Japanese Asians residing in Japan such as Koreans and Chinese, many
of whom were brought over in the heyday of the Empire and forcibly
relocated to Japan to work in the mines and perform other arduous and
dangerous tasks for the prosecution of the ‘holy war’.
viii For the Chinese
and in particular the Korean minority in Japan, a group that amounted at
war’s end to some two-and-a-half million people, the plethora of GHQ
civil liberties directives, electoral reforms and other liberalization
initiatives were a complete failure in preventing a Japanese government-
directed onslaught upon their political and economic rights, their efforts
to preserve their national identity and even their ability to assimilate into
Japanese society.
ix6
These were not the only war victims that continued to lose out during
and long after the Occupation had ended. Atomic bomb survivors
(hibakusha) have faced all sorts of problems, medical, financial and
social, with tens of thousands of Koreans unable for many years to be
officially recognized or remembered as part of this group, and even then
not in the same commemorative area as their Japanese fellow-
sufferers.
x Other war victims whose existence continues to be denied in
certain quarters are the women (perhaps as many as 80% Korean) who
were dragooned to serve as sex-slaves for the Japanese army (jugun-
ianfu).
xi Numbering anywhere between 50,000 and 200,000 people, this
group’s treatment was not taken up by Allied postwar war crimes’
tribunals, although Japan’s wartime enslavement of white women in the
Netherlands’ East Indies was deemed sufficiently serious to be treated
by local Dutch courts as a crime of war.
xii The mistreatment by Japanese
soldiers of non-Asian and Asian POWs is more well known, as is the
Japanese government’s reluctance to admit an ongoing moral or
financial responsibility for their suffering.
xiii But the plight of numerous
Asians in Japan – who were sometimes forced virtually at gunpoint to
participate in Japan’s war effort and then fingered by their ex-colonial
overlords as being responsible for the crimes which they themselves
committed or ordered – has only recently started to become generally
recognized.
xiv
The contrast in treatment of these groups and many of those responsible
for their plight has also been particularly acute. Although the Allies have,
with reason, been criticized for imposing a ‘victor’s justice’ upon Japan,
the pace at which suspected, indicted and convicted Japanese war
criminals were allowed – even by occupation authorities – to rejoin
mainstream society has been the target of considerably less criticism,7
especially among Japanese nationalist circles. First released during the
Occupation and sometimes surreptitiously recruited as members of
GHQ’s intelligence agencies, these elements (which included members
of bacteriological warfare units in China who were suspected of
performing BW experiments with plague germs on human ‘guinea pigs’)
were, within a short period of time after the Occupation had ended,
allowed to become Prime Ministers, Ministers of State, members of the
Diet, bureaucrats, men of industry and finance and members of the
armed forces. As fully funded state pensioners and war veterans, their
war contributions, however dubious, received increasingly overt marks of
official approval, as high government officials from the Emperor on down
began to pay their respects – in violation of the constitutionally
mandated principle of separation of religion and state – at the Shinto
shrine for Japan’s war dead at Yasukuni.
xv Yet while the rehabilitation of
these elements proceeded apace, other Asians who had also
participated in the war effort on Japan’s behalf were stripped of their
Japanese nationality, prevented from receiving state assistance,
pensions, or veterans’ benefits and – as was the case with Korean
miners who were forcibly relocated to the island of Sakhalin during the
war and then abandoned after the Russians took over – denied
relocation expenses back to their country of birth, residence or ethnic
origin by the country responsible for their plight, which for a long time
refused even to acknowledge their existence.
xvi
It has not really been until after the death of Emperor Hirohito in 1989
that these and other stigmatized groups have finally – mainly through the
Japanese court system – been able to ‘address the unfinished business
of World War Two’ by calling Japan’s government to account. Many of
the issues before the courts have concerned problems of financial8
compensation, in the form of unpaid state pensions, repatriation
expenses, veterans’ benefits or other social security benefits.
xvii But the
underlying issues surrounding Japan’s disparate treatment of war
survivors and war dead have not simply or primarily concerned money.
And, because of this, it is sometimes difficult looking at this problem from
the outside to understand the intensity of feelings generated by what at
times seem to be mere formulations of words. Why is it really necessary
for the government to ‘apologize’ for the war? What is the real difference
between an official and an unofficial apology? Why is it not acceptable to
say that Japan ‘advanced into’ rather than ‘invaded’ Asia? Why is the
issue of POW and veterans’ compensation so controversial, given the
declining number of Allied and Japanese veterans who are still alive to
claim it? Why does the Japanese government refuse to bite the bullet
and settle such claims once and for all?
Particularly in view of the negative international fallout accruing to Japan
as a result of the government’s refusal to take decisive action on these
matters, why such issues have for so long remained unresolved requires
explanation. There has certainly been no overwhelming administrative or
financial imperative that has rendered them inherently insoluble, yet the
government has failed to do anything that the plaintiffs or world opinion
could regard as even a sincere indication of positive intent. But while at
first sight seemingly rather trivial, these problems are the outward
manifestations of an organized governmental attempt to evade war
responsibility that originated in the early months of the Occupation, when
GHQ decided to retain and protect from trial a monarch who, as recently
released materials suggest, was much less of a figurehead in the
prosecution of Japan’s war effort than has been widely assumed.
xviii The
preservation of Hirohito and his many years of subsequent rule as the9
Emperor Showa are one of the main reasons why so many people who
were forced to make such sacrifices in his name have had to wait for so
long before being able to settle their accounts. It is largely in recognition
of them that I wish to revisit the issue of the Emperor’s war responsibility
– in particular, why investigation of the subject was evaded and the
repercussions this has had for Japan’s postwar democratization process.
Japan’s Emperors have not always been able to claim the power and
authority that had accrued to the ruler by 1945. For many centuries a
minor and virtually unknown political figure, sometimes actually
imprisoned by Japan’s feudal overlords, the Emperor and his position
within the ruling hierarchy underwent a dramatic change with the
accession of the Emperor Meiji in 1868, the year of Japan’s so-called
opening to the West and the fall of its feudal shogunate. Commonly
called an imperial ‘restoration’, the Emperor was in fact elevated to a
new position of absolute authority, with the rest of the government
organized ostensibly to do no more than advise the all-powerful monarch
and be an accurate transmitter of the Imperial Will. According to the Meiji
Constitution of 1889, the Emperor was declared ‘sacred and
inviolable’,
xix which meant, according to the Meiji patriarch, Ito Hirobumi,
that he was ‘heaven-descended’,  ‘divine’ and ‘preeminent above his
subjects’.
xx He was not simply God’s representative or the executor of a
mandate of heaven that could at least in theory be withdrawn, but was
actually a ‘living god’. In the words of the 1937 Kokutai no Hongi
(Cardinal Principles of the National Polity), the Emperor was a ‘deity
incarnate’ directly descended from the Sun Goddess, who was in turn
supposedly the founder of Japan and the grandmother of the first
Japanese emperor some twenty or thirty centuries earlier.
xxi10
Essential to the course of the entire Occupation reform program was the
question of how the Emperor was to be treated. This was no ordinary
political figure and certainly very different from the generally declining
breed of European hereditary monarchs. To quote Ito Hirobumi, the
Emperor merely had ‘to pay due respect to the law’, but ‘the law’ had ‘no
power to hold Him accountable to it. Not only shall there be no
irreverence for the Emperor’s person, but also shall He neither be made
a topic of derogatory comment nor one of discussion’.
xxii In practical
terms, this meant that he could issue edicts that could override or nullify
Parliamentary actions at any time. It also meant that he was
Commander-in-Chief of Japan’s armed forces, with the power to issue
declarations of war and surrender decrees. A wealthy landowner aided
by his relatives (who were in leadership positions in the Army and Navy
General Staffs during the war years), as well as elder statesmen, privy
councilors and an imperial household of enormous political influence, the
Emperor was at the apex of a traditional, popularly unaccountable and
secretive elite which had placed no real institutional restraints upon his
ability to wage war, make peace or micromanage the country’s activities
in peace or war.
xxiii Therefore, central to the treatment of the Emperor
was the question of whether he would be made accountable for his
wartime actions. For many Japanese at least, it was upon whether the
Showa Emperor would be induced to accept moral responsibility by
declaring that his ‘holy war’ was unequivocally ‘wrong’ that the
commitment of Japan’s other leaders really to ‘turn over a new leaf’ and
accept the democratic process would ultimately depend.
xxiv
GHQ took three major actions in this regard. The first was to get the
Emperor to issue the so-called ‘declaration of humanity’ edict of 1
January, 1946. In this statement, the historically questionable notion that11
‘the ties between me (the Emperors) and my people have always been
formed by mutual trust and affection’  -- which was arguably not much
more than a toned-down reworking of the old imperialistic idea of ‘a
hundred million hearts beating as one’ – was qualified by the important
caveat that such sentiments no longer ‘depend on mere legends and
myths’ or ‘the false conception that the Emperor is divine’. This decline
from divine status, Hirohito nevertheless subsequently insisted, meant
only that he was not a living god or a god in the Western sense; it was
not a renunciation of his supposed direct lineage to the Sun Goddess or
of the sacerdotal functions that his august genes supposedly bestowed
upon him.
xxv Even this, however, was too much for some Japanese
politicians. Shigemitsu Mamoru (a major proponent of the idea that
Japan should accept Allied surrender terms and a representative of
Japan at the surrender ceremony on USS Missouri) exclaimed years
later that ‘there is nothing wrong in the Japanese people worshipping the
emperor as a living kami’.
xxvi Meanwhile, the Prime Minister at the time of
the emperor’s declaration, the renowned ‘anti-militarist’,  ‘pro-western’
‘moderate’ and ‘internationalist’ Shidehara Kijuro, continued to refer
reverentially to his sovereign’s ‘sacred character’ at the very time he was
meant to be involved in drafting a statement in which the Emperor’s
divinity would supposedly be denied.
xxvii
The second action SCAP took was to redefine the Emperor’s political
powers. In the 1947 constitution, which replaced the 1889 Meiji Charter,
the monarch was now described as ‘the symbol of the State and of the
unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with
whom resides sovereign power’.
xxviii Keeping the Emperor as a ‘symbol
of state’ and ‘unity of the people’ was not in itself a particularly
democratic idea. The notion of him continuing to represent the ‘unity of12
the people’ could be interpreted as a reaffirmation of Japan’s supposed
racial purity and cultural homogeneity, two ideas that were central to the
old ‘family nation’ construct in which the right of Koreans, Taiwanese,
Chinese and ‘aliens’ of whatever ethnic background to coexist on an
equal footing with Japanese in Japan was implicitly denied.
Nevertheless, to say that the once-‘inviolable’ ruler, the expression of
whose  ‘will’ had previously been the objective of the entire political
system, now derived his position from the ‘will of the people’ was an
important affirmation of the notion of popular sovereignty that appeared
to mark a major – if by no means unqualified – break with the past.
While these actions were with some justification hailed as progressive
acts of democratization, the third action taken by GHQ  -- the decision to
retain the Emperor system as well as the monarch who had presided
over the worst years of Japanese imperial rule – was much more
controversial. Japan had surrendered without the Allies giving a formal
undertaking to preserve any of its existing government, including the
imperial house. The two US policy statements outlining the parameters
of MacArthur’s mission – the SWNCC/150 Japanese Initial Post-
Surrender document of August 1945 and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Basic
Directive No. 1385 of November, specifically instructed the Supreme
Commander that, in establishing indirect Occupation rule, the ‘use’ of
existing Japanese ruling institutions to execute Occupation directives did
not mean they should either be permanently ‘supported’ or
‘preserved.’
xxix Yet despite this, MacArthur – on his own initiative –
decided not simply to retain the Emperor, but to shield him from any war
crimes investigations. This was in blatant disregard of the adamant
objections of many of the International Military War Crimes’ Tribunal’s
judges (including its chief justice) and intense anti-Emperor sentiments13
of Allied popular opinion, where polls time and again in the United
States, Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere indicated that the
Emperor either was a war criminal or that he should at least be tried to
determine that fact.
xxx  Instead, a view of Japan’s pre-surrender past was
assiduously promoted by GHQ, according to which the Emperor was no
more than the ‘captive’ of a prewar military clique led by Tojo Hideki (a
military general and Prime Minister for most of the Pacific War) which
had somehow ‘taken over’ the political system in the 1930’s to promote
its own aggressive designs.
xxxi
Why was the Supreme Commander so intent upon going the extra mile
to preserve the Japanese ruler? According to the official line later
promoted by GHQ, MacArthur had not made up his mind about the
Emperor until, in a private meeting with the Monarch on 28 September
1945, he was ‘moved’ to the ‘marrow of his being’ (or words to such
effect) by Hirohito’s humility and sincerity in wanting to take personal
responsibility for the war.
xxxii However, reference to an imperial desire to
make war amends was absent from the account of that meeting issued
many years later by the Emperor’s interpreter, the only other person in
on the conversation.
xxxiii In addition, there is little in any other recorded
comments of the Showa Emperor to suggest that he ever voluntarily
desired to make such a gesture, or indeed ever registered genuine
remorse for the war or his role in promoting it.
The other justification MacArthur issued for his action was in a telegram
to US Army Chief of Staff Eisenhower in January 1946, a time when
popular pressure outside Japan for the Hirohito’s indictment as a war
criminal had become particularly intense. In this communication,
MacArthur said that the Emperor was a ‘symbol’ ‘uniting all Japanese’14
who, as captive to the militarists during the entire course of the previous
decade, was simply forced to doing their bidding. On this basis, he
melodramatically warned that Hirohito’s removal and indictment as a war
crimes suspect would induce ‘tremendous’ national ‘convulsion’,
‘disintegration’, a ‘vendetta for revenge… whose cycle may not be
complete for centuries, if ever’, with prospects of a complete government
breakdown, the cessation of ‘civilized practices’ and ‘some form of
intense regimentation probably along communistic lines’ ‘aris(ing) from
the masses’, creating a situation that would require ‘a minimum of a
million troops… for an indefinite number of years’.
xxxiv
It is easy to imagine how such grandiloquence might have stunned
MacArthur’s superiors in Washington into appalled silence and then
awed compliance. But how much of this was actually true is another
question. Japan’s presumed reliance upon the Emperor system had
never been tested by facts, figures, numbers or any other type of serious
empirical investigation. GHQ had never conducted, as MacArthur
misleadingly informed Eisenhower, a systematic investigation into the
Emperor’s pre-surrender political role. The notion that Hirohito was a
mere puppet during this period had been developed largely by
MacArthur’s advisors and accepted by him prior to Japan’s surrender.
This was long before anyone in GHQ could have had access to the
political or military records within Japan that might have indicated
otherwise. That Japan’s surrender might actually have been the result of
a decision taken by the Emperor and imposed by him upon a hopelessly
divided government was simply ignored. Furthermore, even if the
Supreme Commander was correct in all his dire pronouncements, no
reason had yet been advanced as to why the present occupant of the
Imperial Throne should not take personal responsibility for the war by15
abdicating and being replaced by someone else,
xxxv an option that – as
the Emperor himself was aware – had respectable historical
precedents.
xxxvi
MacArthur was perhaps on his firmest ground in warning against the
abolition of the Emperor system entirely. Even here, however, what
information we now have indicates that the terrain was extremely slushy.
In answering pollsters’ question about whether the Emperor and imperial
institution should remain, most Japanese in post-Occupation surveys
have responded in the affirmative.
xxxvii But whether that represented a
deep attachment to the monarch and what he stood for is questionable.
In a survey conducted by the US Strategic Bombing Survey in early
1946 as to the feelings of ordinary Japanese when they heard Japan
had surrendered, only 4% registered a sense of ‘worry’,  ‘shame’ or
‘sorrow’ for the Emperor.
xxxviii This tended to be confirmed by the regional
reports of military police and the Home Ministry’s Special Thought Police
during the autumn of 1945. In them, there are references to ‘words and
deeds against the Emperor’ ‘tending to increase’ as part of ‘the general
public’s distrust and antipathy’  ‘towards those who govern’ (Shiga
Prefecture); to children singing somewhat irreverent songs; and to
homeless people invading shrines and temples and hanging their
diapers in sacred areas previously dedicated at least in part to the
preservation of the imperial sacerdotal mystique.
xxxix
There was little evidence in any of all this indicating that the demise of
the imperial institution would have caused a great deal of public
anxiety.
xl Much of the imperial kudos had evaporated when the Emperor
made his 15 August pronouncement bringing his ‘holy war’ to an end.
xli
Most people were subsequently much more concerned with the16
mundane but crucial problems of finding food, clothing, shelter, family
and simply managing to survive. According to a December 1945 report
of a unit of  GHQ’s Civil Intelligence Section that was operating in Tokyo,
‘with regard to the Emperor system…. the Allies are unduly
apprehensive of the effect on the Japanese if the Emperor was
removed… at the most there might be demonstrations… particularly in
the rural districts… but these would soon pass’.  The unit went on to say
that ‘many people have reached a state where it is almost immaterial to
them whether the Emperor is retained or not’; that ‘the younger
generation are not regarding him with the same degree of dignity as
formerly’; and that ‘he has even become the “point” of many jokes in the
past three months’.
xlii  This was in almost shocking contrast to the notion
piously advanced by Joseph Grew, US Ambassador to Japan between
1931 and 1941, that the relationship of the Emperor to his people could
be equated to that of the Queen Bee and the hive: remove the Queen
and the hive disintegrates.
xliii
Not only (as is suggested above) was there little to suggest that the hive
(Japanese people) was continuing to operate around the Queen Bee
principle; there was even less to suggest a particular attachment to the
present Queen Bee herself  (Hirohito). Amongst the frenzied speculation
circulating the country about the future of the Emperor in the autumn of
1945 included rumours that his ancestors were not even Japanese, a
development that prompted residents in Shimonoseki, according to the
Civil Intelligence Section, to express their ‘preference for a Japanese
president rather than an Emperor of Indian ancestry’.
xliv To add to the
uncertainty, a Nagano man claimed superior lineage to the gods than
Hirohito by virtue of his descent from the southern rather than northern
courts of the fourteenth century imperial family.
xlv At about the same17
time, a housewife in Yamaguchi prefecture founded a new religion
(Amaterasu Kotai Jingukyo) (Religion of the Great Shrine of Amaterasu)
by claiming that she had recently been impregnated by something that
was sufficiently special to give her a direct line to the Sun Goddess.
Unsurprisingly, both these characters – who were only part of a larger
line of colourful pretenders that sprang up at this time – had little time for
the present emperor, who was openly castigated as a ‘war criminal’.
Such criticism generated instant press copy, celebrity status and – in the
case of the Amaterasu Kotai religion – a popular following of over
300,000 within a few years. In this way, a phenomenon that was later
described as a ‘rush hour of the gods’ played its part in breaking down
the notion of ‘ten thousand generations in a single line’: i.e. that the
present imperial family could claim direct, unbroken descent to the deity
from the beginning of time.
xlvi
While at a popular level the layers of religious mystique surrounding the
emperor were being removed, the prospect of Hirohito’s abdication
(although not uniformly supported) was being taken seriously by Japan’s
intelligentsia and political elite, if only as a way of preserving the integrity
of the imperial institution. GHQ was in the process of trying to avoid this
possibility by attributing all responsibility for Japan’s imperial past to a
cabal of ‘militarists’ to be tried as Class A war crimes’ suspects. But few
people seemed to believe that such a strategy would really exonerate
the Emperor.  A military report quoted in the diary of imperial vice
chamberlain, Kinoshita Michio, reflected the general Japanese belief that
‘as the ruler, he (the Emperor) bears responsibility for the nation’s war
unless he is a robot’.
xlvii On this basis, scions of the Japanese
establishment including Prince Higashikuni, the Emperor’s uncle and first
postwar prime minister,
xlviii Prince Konoe, one of the most powerful18
Japanese politicians since the mid 1930s, Prince Mikasa, the Emperor’s
younger brother, Kido Koichi, a lord keeper of the privy seal and one-
time Home Minister, and Mibuchi Tadahiko, chief justice of Japan’s
Supreme Court, believed Hirohito bore legal and moral responsibility for
the war, urging him at various times (including the autumn of 1945) to
stand down as a way of saving the throne and perhaps the indignity of a
war crimes trial.
xlix
All this was in stark contrast to the efforts subsequently made particularly
in the West to show how the supposedly ‘peace loving’ Emperor could
only have played a minimal role in the day-to-day decision-making
during the period Japan was on the rampage.
l But had this really been
true, how or why such a supposedly ‘hands-off’, or ‘captive’, monarch
could have made the personal initiative Hirohito took in agreeing finally
to surrender is hard to explain. Furthermore, having succeeded in
August 1945 in finally stopping the war, the question remained as to
whether the monarch could have made more of an effort to stop it
earlier. He certainly had the opportunity at least to try when Prince
Konoe presented a memorial to the Throne in early 1945 petitioning the
Emperor immediately to end the war – an act that would have prevented
the subsequent fire bombings of Tokyo, the carnage in Okinawa and the
dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
li As far as Konoe
and others were concerned, the Emperor’s strategy of ‘adopting the
English style of constitutional practice’ of ‘avoiding to take the initiative
as much as possible’ when – unlike England –  ‘His Majesty is able
(through the constitution) to control both the government and the High
Command’, amounted to a willful ‘passivity’ in the conduct of state
affairs. This, it could be argued, just as surely hastened the final
destruction reigned down upon Japan at the end of World War Two as it19
encouraged the Kwantung Army to make provocative strikes into
Manchuria and the rest of China in the 1930’s.
lii
Japanese first-hand sources – ranging from the Kido Diary and Saionji-
Harada memoirs to Hirohito’s own written recollections of his role in the
wartime period that was prepared with his senior advisors in early-1946
(the Monologue)
liii  – reveal that the Emperor (particularly from 1937
onwards when the need to mediate friction between the increasingly
powerful army and navy factions became more intense) often played a
more ‘hands-on’ role than was suggested in Konoe’s depiction.
liv But the
important point is that, as a ruler with constitutional powers to hire or fire
cabinets and cabinet members at will, Hirohito could not – even in the
minds of many of his closest relatives, advisors and political colleagues
– avoid moral responsibility for the catastrophic consequences of either
his action or inaction; both were largely a matter of choice. At the very
least, even if, as poet Miyoshi Tatsuji posited in a spring 1946 magazine
article,  ‘he really could not control the army and navy under his
command and had given up trying to do so’, continuing to tell his
subjects that they were ‘the Emperor’s soldiers’ going into battle to fulfil
the imperial ‘will’ amounted to a ‘negligence in the performance of his
duties’ and betrayal of his people that ‘made his responsibility all the
greater.’
lv As ex-Privy Seal and Home Minister Kido Koichi argued in
late-1951, when languishing in Sugamo prison as a convicted Grade A
war criminal, ‘no matter how one looks at it, the Emperor bears
responsibility for losing this war (kondo no haisen ni tsuite wa nan
toshitemo heika ni go sekinin aru)’. He went on to say in a note delivered
to the Emperor via his son that he should ‘abdicate for the sake of your
imperial ancestors and for the nation’, warning him that a failure to do so
would bring about an ‘end result that only the Imperial family will not20
have taken responsibility and an unclear mood will remain which, I fear,
might leave an eternal scar’.
lvi
While often advanced (particularly in the case of Kido and Konoe) for
political reasons in order to minimize their own responsibility for
Japanese wartime excesses, these were serious arguments.
Furthermore, the premise upon which they were based -- that absolute
power entailed unavoidable responsibility – was generally upheld as late
as 1944 even by those within GHQ who were later to argue against the
Emperor’s indictment. In a psychological study of the Japanese
prepared for his chief, MacArthur aide General Bonner Fellers admitted
that  ‘as Emperor and acknowledged head of state, Hirohito cannot
escape war guilt. He must be considered an instigator of the Pacific
War’.
lvii In October 1945, Joseph Grew, the chief American defender of
the Japanese imperial house and supporter of the notion of the peace-
loving monarch, concluded ruefully that the Emperor could not avoid
responsibility for having signed the declaration of war and that
consequently ‘Hirohito will have to go’.
lviii
Yet, by the beginning of  1946, the newly-arrived chief prosecutor for the
war crimes trials, Joseph Keenan, was telling his staff (the International
Prosecution Section) that the Emperor was absolutely not to be a target
of investigation and that anyone who could not agree to this should ‘by
all means go home immediately’.
lix Meanwhile, GHQ officials told the
Palace to stop any ‘funny talk’ about the possibility of abdication,
lx while
arrested war crimes suspects who, under interrogation, were prepared to
talk about imperial responsibility, were accused of evading their own. In
this way, Konoe Fumimaro – one politician particularly well qualified to
talk about the subject – was derided by his American interrogator as a21
‘rat… quite prepared to sell anyone to save himself’ by going ‘so far as
to call his master, the Emperor, “the major war criminal”’.
lxi As Fellers
was reported to have said (to Yonai Mitsumasa) in early March, ‘it would
be most convenient if the Japanese side could prove to us that the
Emperor is completely blameless’ by having people such as these and
‘Tojo, in particular, being made to bear all responsibility at his trial’
instead.
lxii
Why MacArthur was prepared to go to the length of subverting the
course of the International War Crimes Tribunal to prevent the Emperor
from being prosecuted requires some explanation. The answer certainly
does not lie in the policy directives from Washington advocating indirect
rule; as late as January 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State-
War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) specifically mentioned that
they had no expectations that the Emperor would be shielded from war
crimes trial proceedings.
lxiii But one of the assumptions shared by
MacArthur and his aides was that ‘the people of Japan, who believe
themselves to be gods, are unaware of and absolutely cannot
understand either democracy or American political idealism’.
lxiv
Assuming that the Japanese, who in war propaganda had been
described as monkeys and subsequently referred to by MacArthur as
‘children’, were congenitally incapable of reaching the exalted state of
their occupiers, the best thing to do was to rely on what was perceived to
be, in the words of an aide, ‘their blind obedience to the Emperor’
lxv by
utilizing the monarch to achieve Occupation goals. The Emperor’s
surrender announcement had been extremely successful in getting
Japanese soldiers to lay down their arms and accept a foreign
occupation without violence or bloodshed.
lxvi It was therefore tempting for
the imperious MacArthur to insert GHQ into the space that the old22
discredited military cliques had vacated, using (as had the feudal
shoguns before him) the newly subordinated Emperor and his autocratic
powers to legitimate and execute his commands. This meant that
nothing could be allowed to undermine what was described as ‘the
mystic hold the Emperor has on his people’
lxvii – whether it be war crimes
trials, popular demonstrations against the Emperor, republican forms of
thought or any type of mass action that sought radically to undermine
existing lines of authority.
Under this scenario, prospects for genuine democratic reform seemed
limited. Nor did such an objective figure prominently in the minds of
some of the most influential US policymakers towards Japan. In May
1945, Joseph Grew expressed his considered opinion to President
Truman that, ‘from the long range point of view the best we can hope for
in Japan is the development of a constitutional monarchy, experience
having shown that democracy in Japan would never work’.
lxviii  According
to this viewpoint, the job of the Occupation would be to do not much
more than eliminate the more uncooperative (i.e. pro-German) militarists
and their supporters from the Japanese elite, while relying on those
members of the oligarchy who had been ‘less outspokenly and obviously
anxious to precipitate war with the United States and Britain’.
lxix But
these people (who included court officials, zaibatsu chiefs and certain
trusted navy officers) were the so-called ‘moderates’ upon whom prewar
US and British diplomats had so unsuccessfully relied in the 1930s. As
one of Grew’s critics pointed out in 1944, ‘British and US tories declare
that the Emperor must be kept in a beaten Japan as a safeguard against
Communism. The problem in Japan is not and has never been
Communism. It is feudalism… The dangers…  that for 70 years have led
Japan along the war path… do not spring from the masses; they come23
from the ruling class’.
lxx  The problem with the so-called ‘moderates’ or
‘liberals’, according to this view, was – to quote New Dealer and Asian
expert, Thomas Bisson – that ‘they are much more closely allied to the
militarists, whom we are asked to concentrate on eliminating, than to the
people as a whole’.
lxxi
Had Hirohito taken Konoe’s advice and surrendered at the beginning of
1945, it is likely that the Occupation’s democratization program would
never have gone beyond the Grew prescription. But Grew and his Japan
Crowd assistants at the State Department were replaced during the
summer by a coalition of China specialists under Dean Acheson who
were influenced to a greater extent by New Dealers and progressives of
various stripes. Also no doubt appalled by the bloodbaths of the last few
months of the Pacific War, these people wanted to implement a broader
based policy that sought to eradicate not simply a few war-like people in
Japan but the country’s ‘will to war’ itself.  As a result, a broad range of
political and social reform directives were sent to the Japanese
government during the first six months of the Occupation that included
fairly far-reaching purges of those considered linked to Japanese
imperial expansion, the abolition of all constraints on free speech, the
liberation of political prisoners, the abolition of the Thought Police,
education reform, the eradication of militaristic school textbooks, the
disestablishment of the Shinto religion, electoral reform (widening the
franchise to women) and the elimination of restraints upon the formation
of labour unions. In order to dismantle the economic organization of
Japan’s war machine, preliminary efforts were also made to undermine
the monopolistic power of the relatively small number of big financial
conglomerates (zaibatsu dissolution) and initiate a program of war
reparations.
lxxii24
Although often carried out with zeal and skill, these measures were
implemented by a privileged neo-colonial elite that had little expectation
that the Japanese – the defeated and emaciated enemy with the
supposedly strong ‘herd instincts’ – would respond with anything more
than  ‘obsequious’ gratitude for their improved lot. But the myriad
problems of bad harvests, food shortages, unemployment,
hyperinflation, a rampant black market, a massive robbery of state
assets by Japanese government officials and their big-business and
military cronies and the complete failure of the Occupation and its wage
and price controls to stem any of this galvanized the Japanese to take
matters into their own hands. By the end of 1946, what a State
Department official had described as ‘inert and tradition-bound’
Japanese
lxxiii had taken advantage of the liberalized trade union laws to
generate a radical union movement that had unionized almost six million
workers and engaged in widespread, and at times extremely
imaginative, industrial action. Meanwhile, millions of people participated
in ‘food mayday’ demonstrations across the country in April and May,
culminating in a demonstration on 19 May 1946 in front of the Imperial
Palace of 250,000, waving placards with the words ‘let us eat enough to
be able to work’, requesting entrance to the well-stocked Palace
kitchens, but also respectfully addressing the Emperor (in many cases)
to solve the situation in the traditional way of getting rid of his corrupt
advisors and replacing them with those more in touch with popular
needs.
lxxiv
While impressive, the upsurge of labour activism was never intended to
undermine the Occupation or its goals. Nor was it particularly disruptive.
While numerous strikes occurred (largely the result of rampant inflation25
wiping out every gain won by workers), most of them were short lived,
often less than 24 hours. Only once, according to GHQ/SCAP figures,
did total man days lost to labour disputes exceed 1% of total labour
output between 1945 and 1948.
lxxv Indeed, production was often
maintained or increased during industrial action, as was the case with
the ‘production control’ movement, when workers often acting on their
own initiative simply took over the shop floor, locked out management,
raised production (while revealing the incompetence or machinations of
their managers who were sometimes suspected of sabotaging
production by deliberate mismanagement in the hope of inducing an
Occupation clampdown) and then relinquished management functions
once their demands were met. All this, however, was met with a warning
by MacArthur on 20 May 1946 that ‘the growing tendency towards mass
violence and physical processes of intimidation, under organized
leadership, present a grave menace to the future development of
Japan’.
lxxvi This was a devastating blow to unions, the labour movement
and those who were looking to extend democracy by peaceful action
from below. When this was followed by his last-minute prohibition of a
General Strike planned for 1 February the following year, the future of
the Occupation’s entire democratization program was put into question.
It was largely in response to these developments that GHQ first
prepared itself for a dramatic scaling back of initial Occupation goals. As
a result, the Left wept ‘tears of limitless anger’ towards the Occupation
authorities for, in the words of General Strike organizer Ii Yasujiro,
‘deceiving the Japanese people with democracy only at the tip of their
tongues’, while conservative Old Guard politicians such as Yoshida
Shigeru became ecstatic as they saw a chance for a political
comeback.
lxxvii Meanwhile, at the Imperial Palace, the talk about Hirohito26
having to abdicate to take responsibility for the war and save the
imperial institution that had coloured the first few months of the
Occupation receded markedly. Shrewdly assessing the changing tenor
of the times, Imperial Vice Chamberlain Kinoshita Michio stated in his
diary sometime in early 1946, in order to quash abdication talk once and
for all, that ‘it is of vital importance… to implant the impression that the
present emperor is the most desirable and trustworthy person for the
United States in the control of Japan and also in international relations,
particularly in the Orient’.
lxxviii
The Emperor proved to be a quick student. Only four days after the Food
Mayday demonstration of 19 May, Hirohito used his authority on
MacArthur’s behalf by issuing a public announcement to the starving
people who had fought and whose relatives had died in his name to
‘forget individual selfish desires’ and ‘carry out the beautiful tradition of
our country, namely the family state’.
lxxix Nor did such behaviour change
with the promulgation of the postwar constitution early the following year.
In a further attempt to curry favour with his foreign overlords, the same
monarch who would subsequently be portrayed by enthusiastic western
chroniclers of Japan’s postwar ‘success story’ as a ‘modern’ symbol of
state deprived of political power recommended in September 1947
through imperial aide Terasaki Hidenori to William Sebald, MacArthur’s
Political Advisor, that he wished to see the enormously unpopular
military occupation of Okinawa prolonged indefinitely.
lxxx It was becoming
clear that, constitution or not, Hirohito saw his survival and role as a
monarch primarily in terms of doing the bidding of his masters rather
than reflecting the will or interests of the people whose representative he
was now constitutionally supposed to have become.27
Whether the Emperor survived because of MacArthur’s disenchantment
with the democratic process or whether it was the decision to retain him
that made MacArthur’s change-of-policy towards the Japanese people
more difficult to avoid seems (at least to me) something of a chicken-
and-egg problem. But, taken together, the two developments had a huge
effect in undermining real prospects for reform. In the words of one of
the leading western historians on the subject:
‘American policymakers acted on the premise that the monarchic
principle and western style democracy were theoretically
compatible. That very premise, however, blunted the full potential
of the democratic revolution that Washington had just initiated. The
reformed Japanese monarchy, which dissembled on the question
of its own morality and which the United States supported,
immediately tilted the struggle for democracy in postwar Japan in
favour of the “moderate” politicians of the ancien  regime. The
conservatives would always be tempted thereafter to utilize the
symbol monarchy not only to reinstate continuity but to serve their
own political purposes whenever the need arose, just as
MacArthur had. Of all the consequences that followed from the
American decision to exonerate Hirohito of war responsibility, that
was surely the most momentous’.
lxxxi
This was not the end of the story, however. Although the retention of the
monarchy did eventually lead to a blunting of the democratic revolution,
the long-term survival of the monarchy depended upon the shape of a
new national charter that would institutionalize many of the earlier
democratization and demilitarization directives. Until that time,
MacArthur, as Supreme Commander, could use the Emperor to govern
Japan if he deemed necessary. But  MacArthur was informed by
Washington in January 1946 that ‘your authority to make policy
decisions on constitutional reform’ would only continue ‘substantially
unimpaired until the Far Eastern Commission (an inter allied
policymaking body for Japan under Washington’s aegis that was slated28
to go into operation at the end of February) promulgates its own
decisions on this subject’.
lxxxii Neither the US government nor its allied
partners had come out in favour of preserving the Japanese monarchy.
Furthermore, the public opinion of all allied countries was strongly in
favour of trying or executing Hirohito as a war criminal.
lxxxiii It was
therefore quite possible that, unless GHQ could resolve this problem
before the Far Eastern Commission came into operation, the Allied
home governments would, through the Far Eastern Commission, either
insist upon a new constitution that was republican or insist upon
Hirohito’s abdication.
In October 1945, MacArthur had entrusted the whole process of
constitutional reform to two committees of very conservative Japanese
establishment figures with close links to the government. Their proposals
came nowhere near the terms of the Potsdam Declaration surrender
terms that mandated ‘freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought’,
‘respect for fundamental human rights’, ‘the removal of all obstacles to
the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the
Japanese people’ and ‘the establishment in accordance with the freely
expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and
responsible government’.
lxxxiv The committee members also had no
intention even of getting rid of the Meiji Constitution or the ‘inviolable’
position of the Emperor within it. Partly in response to various GHQ
officials’ encouragement, a number of Japanese extra-governmental
groups started ‘freely expressing the will of the Japanese people’ on this
subject, generating by the end of 1945 a wide variety of alternative
drafts, including republican charters, in which notions of popular
sovereignty and individual rights were more solidly enshrined. So when
one of Japan’s national dailies ‘scooped’ one of the committee’s drafts29
(the other committee disbanded when its chairman, Konoe, committed
suicide) and revealed to the public that it simply sought to preserve the
status quo, MacArthur knew he had to act before the pressure for more
radical change both within Japan and without would result in the
implementation of constitutional arrangements over which he had no
control and in which neither the Emperor system nor Hirohito might
figure.
lxxxv
It was therefore as a result of this pressure ‘from below’ and ‘from
without’ (i.e. allied public opinion) that MacArthur felt forced to instruct
GHQ Government Section to produce a draft of its own that would be
based upon three principles: i) preservation of the Emperor; ii) abolition
of war as a right of the nation and prohibition of Japanese armed forces
on its soil; and iii) the abolition of the peerage. New Dealers and
progressives within Government Section utilized these instructions, as
well as many of the draft charters produced by the Japanese extra-
governmental groups, to produce a constitution (in less than ten days)
that contained novel and sometimes far-reaching provisions concerning
popular sovereignty, individual rights, equality of the sexes and the
renunciation of war.
lxxxvi But that the Supreme Commander could go from
the idea of no new constitution (October 1945) to accepting what in
many ways was a very progressive national charter (February 1946) was
not because of any personal commitment to radical democracy
(especially for Japan) but because he realized that such would be the
political price he – as well as the Japanese Old Guard – would have to
pay to be assured of preserving the monarch.
lxxxvii In Imperial Vice
Chamberlain Kinoshita’s words (March 5), MacArthur was ‘frantically....
trying to make Japan proclaim the democratized constitution which30
GHQ’s Government Section made’ in order to ‘head off the international
mood of opposition to the Emperor System’.
lxxxviii
Efforts to undermine the progressive thrust of the constitution occurred
almost as soon as the government was entrusted to translate the GHQ
draft into Japanese.
lxxxix If only better to argue that a draft drawn up
entirely by foreigners could actually represent the ‘freely expressed will’
of the Japanese people, GHQ anticipated and welcomed amendments
to the document as it went through the ratification process in the Diet.
But the government liaisons with GHQ tried to take advantage of this to
use strange Japanese terminology to qualify notions of popular
sovereignty and sought to redefine the constitution’s meaning in terms of
‘maintaining the Emperor’s authority as the centre of the life of the
people’ and ‘source of their spiritual guidance’. They also tried to
undermine the permanence of all individual liberties and rights in the
charter by making them ‘subject to the law’.
xc While GHQ officials saw
through some of this, they were, unfortunately for minorities in Japan,
tricked by chief government negotiator Sato Tatsuo when he told them
that there was no need for a clause guaranteeing equal protections for
resident aliens since such guarantees existed elsewhere in the
constitution. In fact they existed only for the Japanese (or kokumin).
Resulting in the loss by Koreans and Chinese in Japan of rights they had
previously at least theoretically enjoyed as members of the Japanese
empire (such as the ballot), this marked the first shot in an unnecessary
and often tragic postwar story of official discrimination and harassment,
as the government successfully utilized what was to others a democratic
constitution to institutionalize and deepen (often with the help of
Occupation armed forces) the process of lowering non-Japanese Asians
to a sub-human level.
xci31
  Much, however, remained, including a no-war clause that even
according to conservatives such as Yoshida Shigeru unequivocally
renounced Japan’s involvement in all wars, including those of self-
defence.
xcii But it was as the rest of the Occupation’s reform program
continued to unravel with the onset of the Cold War, the Reverse
Course, the post-Occupation Japan-US Security Treaty, the creation of
the euphemistically-termed Self-Defence Forces and the endless
pressure from a United States now wedded to the idea of preserving
Japan as a bastion of Free World capitalism to ‘shoulder a fairer share’
of the country’s ‘defence requirements’ that the continuing existence of
the unrevised constitution and its no-war clause became a crucial
checking mechanism for the majority of Japanese people opposed to
these developments. As a result, a charter that the well-respected British
authority on Japan, Sir George Sansom, dismissed as ‘rather idiotic’
became of overriding importance, as an institutional means and rallying
cry, for the development of a genuine grass-roots, popular democracy.
xciii
As can be seen from the union movement of the late-1940’s, the peace
movement of the 1950’s, the anti-nuclear and student movements of the
1960’s, the consumer movement of the 1970s, the anti-fingerprint
movement of the 1980’s, the war victims’ efforts of the 1990s and the
women’s movement throughout the postwar era, many people,
Japanese and foreign, have stepped forward to advance the cause.
 As another reminder of the importance of the constitution’s existence,
the Monarchy has also survived. In principle the constitutional
representative of the popular will, the Emperor has nevertheless
remained a symbol of the more conservative (and racial) idea of the
‘unity of his people’, with his descent from the Gods affirmed as recently
as 1990, with traditional Shinto accession ceremonies for the new32
Emperor Heisei taking place at the shrine to the Sun Goddess at Ise. As
a result of what Kido Koichi had described as the ‘eternal scar’ resulting
from his failure to take responsibility for the war, the long years of
Hirohito’s postwar rule also witnessed a growing imperial isolation from
his subjects and the gradual re-imposition of a taboo upon all discussion
of his and his family’s activities. In one of the few attempts to bring down
this ‘chrysanthemum curtain’, the mayor of Nagasaki in 1988 and 1989 –
in answer to a question from a communist party assemblyman about
Hirohito’s war responsibility – publicly upbraided himself for sending
troops under him to die for the Emperor during the war, and stated later
to journalists that, had Hirohito ‘resolved to end the war earlier, there
would have been no Battle of Okinawa and no nuclear attacks on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki’. But his efforts at self-examination and an
honest reassessment of the wartime past resulted in death threats from
rightist groups culminating in an assassination attempt in 1990 in which
he was seriously wounded.
xciv Although Hirohito went to the grave in
1989 with his own war responsibility unexamined, the postwar
constitution survives and the issue of war responsibility shows no sign of
going away. In this context, it is particularly ironic that, having survived
the Showa era, the 1947 charter and the Emperor System that its initial
promulgation was so effective in preserving remain two of the most
durable features of modern Japanese politics, seemingly diametrically
opposed but also inextricably inter-linked.
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